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i
“What is true Reality?” is the fundamental question Nishida KitarO 
asked throughout his long career. His first answer to this question was 
“pure experience,” which precedes the addition of any ideation what­
soever and which is prior to subject-object duality. Passing through an 
understanding of the true Reality as the “absolute free will,” Nishida 
then arrived at the notion of basho or “place,” which is “absolute 
Nothingness.” Through still further articulation, Nishida came to 
grasp the true Reality as the “dialectical universal,” “Self-identity in 
and through absolute contradiction,” and finally as the “world of 
historical reality.” In other words, in his later period Nishida 
understands true Reality to be the “world of historical reality,” which 
is simply another term for “pure experience,” the “place of absolute 
Nothingness,” or “Self-identity in and through absolute contradic­
tion.” Since the notion of the world of historical reality is true Reality 
as understood by Nishida in his later years, in order to comprehend the 
relation between philosophy, religion, and aesthetics in Nishida’s 
thought we should try to understand it from the standpoint of the 
world of historical reality.
The world of historical reality, or the historical world, is not the 
world as understood to exist over and against the self. It is the world in 
which we are bom, work, and die. It is the boundless openness in 
which the interrelationship between the self and the world takes place.
* This paper was originally delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Academy of Religion held at Atlanta, Georgia, November, 1986.
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It is the world realized at absolute present which includes infinite past 
and infinite future. It is the unobjectifiable and unconceptualizable liv­
ing reality in which the human seif and the environment mutually deter­
mine one another. Thus, the world is always forming itself “from the 
formed to the forming” in terms of a dynamic identity of opposition 
and contradiction. Speaking from the determination by the human 
self, this self-formation of the world is understood to be directed im­
manently; whereas, speaking from the determination by the environ­
ment, it is understood to be directed transcendently. The historical 
world consists of the self-identity of these two directions, immanence 
and transcendence, and always includes two opposing poles. In other 
words, in the historical actual world the transcendent is realized in the 
immanent and conversely the immanent is realized in the transcendent. 
Accordingly, the historical world is always confronting a crisis, and pre­
cisely because it is so, it is the living, creative, actual world.
It is the standpoint of art and aesthetics that goes beyond the concep­
tual realm and always grasps the transcendent immanently by means of 
physical and bodily production; that is, potesis. On the contrary, it is 
the standpoint of learning that goes beyond the actual realm and 
always grasps the immanent transcendently by abstracting and univer­
salizing the particular entities. The actual, historical world consists of 
the identity of these two opposing directions, represented by art and 
learning. Thus artistic intuition and theoretical speculation stand con­
trary to each other and yet, fundamentally speaking, both of them are 
the historical, formative function of the actual world, which is the self­
identity in and through absolute contradiction between the forming 
and the formed. Accordingly, art is not a product of merely subjective 
imagination but has an artistic reality as a product of more fundamen­
tal self-formation out of the historical world. Otherwise it is merely 
play, not art. Art is, however, an immanent self-expression of the 
objective, historical world. Thus, although true art is not separate 
from historical actuality, it is a kind of abstraction due to its one-sided 
direction. It is an objectification of life. On the other hand, learning is 
not a product of abstract speculation but has a universal reality as a 
product of more fundamental self-formation of the historical world. 
Even logic is a form of self-expression of the historical world in which 
a speculative self reflects the world in a constructive manner. Learning 
(including science) is, however, a transcendent self-expression of the ob-
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jective, historical world. Accordingly, although true learning is not 
separated from historical actuality, it is a kind of abstraction due to its 
one-sided direction.
II
Now, what is the relationship between art and morality or between 
artistic creation and moral practice? Again these two stand in contradic­
tion to each other. In artistic creation the self becomes an object: the 
self renounces itself into an object and expresses itself characteristically 
in and through that object. On the other hand, in moral practice, an ob­
ject becomes the self: the self creates and changes an object through its 
body and mind in this historical world. Praxis indicates the self’s activi­
ty in the manner of historical formative function. Otherwise morality 
remains something within human consciousness. Accordingly, in ar­
tistic creation the self becomes an object, whereas in moral practice an 
object becomes the self. However, both artistic creation and moral 
practice are self-formations of more fundamental self-expressions of 
the world of historical reality which is self-identity in and through ab­
solute contradiction between the forming and the formed.
Nishida criticized ethics in the past by saying that it usually starts 
from the standpoint of the moral subject based on the abstract con­
scious self and does not escape subjectivism even when it emphasizes 
reason. In order to overcome abstract morality we must take practice 
as the historical practice creating things with oneness of body-mind in 
the historical world.
Philosophy is established when learning and knowledge, instead of 
moving externally or objectively, internally reflect themselves and enter 
into their deepest basis; that is, philosophy actualizes itself when 
through self-reflection the objective knowledge turns into subjective, 
existential self-realization which has personal significance. In 
philosophy, the self reflects itself within itself. This personal, existen­
tial realization of the self is nothing but the self reflecting the world 
within itself and becoming a focal point of the world. Speaking from 
the standpoint of the world, the world reflects itself within the self and 
becomes an expression of the self. In short, philosophy is the self­
realization of true self and the self-realization of the true world at one 
and the same time.
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All learning, arts, and morality touch upon the basic reality of the 
self-identity in and through absolute contradiction. They come into be­
ing out of the absolute relationship between the self and the Absolute. 
But in the direction of moral practice, for instance, we do not confront 
the problem of the self’s existence because its direction presupposes the 
existence of the self.
Religion is realized when the self goes beyond learning, ethics, and 
aesthetics and enters into an absolute relation with the Absolute—that 
is, when the self faces the absolute alternative concerning whether to 
follow one’s own self or to follow the Absolute by giving up the self. 
This is a crossroad of eternal life and eternal death that the self is, fun­
damentally, always facing.
The direction of historical and social practice as represented by 
morality, art, and learning is different from religion in which the self 
confronts the Absolute in the locus of self-existence. The former takes 
values in question, whereas the latter takes the very existence of the self 
in question. As God asked Abraham to sacrifice his only son Isaac, the 
self is asked to effect its absolute negation. At the bottom of our ex­
istence the self perpetually faces absolute death. Through absolute 
death, however, we enter into eternal life. To enter into eternal life 
does not indicate an entrance into a meditative life on the far shore, but 
rather to work in this historical world as a focal point of the Absolute 
and to form the world historically. In this sense, religion is the most 
basic fact of our daily life.
Philosophy in the past viewed the world from the standpoint of the 
self and did not question the existence of the self. Even Descartes, who 
emphasized cogito ergo sum, established his philosophy within the 
perspective of the conscious self and did not penetrate deeply into the 
basis of the conscious self by breaking through it. Nishida strongly 
demands the radical transformation of such a subjectivistic standpoint, 
and emphasizes the realization of the unconceptualizable and unobjec- 
tifiable true Reality as the absolute Nothingness, self-identity in and 
through absolute contradiction, and the world of historical reality. To 
Nishida, the most fundamental fact in the realization of the historical 
world is the fact functioning beyond the bottom of the realization of 
our conscious self as the self-identity in and through absolute contradic­
tion. It is a relationship established by the absolute other in which the 
self relates to itself. Here philosophy and religion converge. However,
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philosophy and religion are not immediately identical. Starting from 
the realization of the above-mentioned fundamental fact, religion 
reveals the standpoint in which fact thoroughly becomes fact itself. By 
contrast, philosophy, though starting from the same realization, 
presents the standpoint in which fact reflects fact itself. Thus it may be 
said that religion and philosophy represent two opposing directions im­
plied in the most fundamental fact of true Reality.
Thus the fundamental fact of true Reality cannot be grasped by the 
objective logic which has made natural science its own model or which 
is based on the conscious self. On the other hand, Nishida’s logic of 
place as absolute Nothingness is the logic of the fundamental fact of 
completely unobjectifiable true Reality. As Nishida says:
My logic of place as [the logic of] the self-identity in and 
through absolute contradiction is nothing but a logical at­
tempt at grasping the world from the standpoint of realiza­
tion of the historical self.1
1 Nishida KitarO ZenshQ (The Collected Works of Nishida KitarO), Vol. X, p. 118.
The standpoint of the realization of the historical self is beyond and yet 
includes the realization of the conscious self. Our conscious self is 
realized within the world of historical reality. Thinking, feeling, and 
willing all are realized in the process of historical development of the 
world which is the self-determination of absolute Nothingness. The 
world of historical reality is the most immediate, unobjectifiable true 
Reality in which learning, arts, and morality all are grounded.
Ill
Let me compare Nishida’s philosophy with that of Whitehead, partic­
ularly in terms of their understandings of philosophy, religion, and 
aesthetics. Many scholars have already determined that the modes of 
thought found in these two philosophers have remarkable similarities. 
In his earlier work Art and Morality, Nishida emphasizes the unity of 
truth, beauty, and goodness and his emphasis shows a considerable 
parallel with Whitehead’s discussion of truth, beauty, and goodness in 
his book Adventures of Ideas. In my view, however, this is merely an 
apparent similarity and there is structural and qualitative difference be-
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tween Nishida and Whitehead. Nishida states in the preface of Arts 
and Morality, “I pursued the internal relationship between intuition 
and moral will in the relationship between intuition and reflection of 
volitional self.”2 He discusses unity of truth, beauty, and goodness 
from the standpoint of Zettai-ishi that is, the absolute Will.
2 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 239.
’ Process and Reality, corrected ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 31.
4 Ibid., p. 32.
Going beyond intellect, emotion, and volition in the ordinary sense, 
the absolute Will is realized in the infinite depth of free self which can 
be attained only by renouncing the self. The union point of truth, 
beauty, and goodness is realized only in this infinite depth of the ab­
solute Will. However, we hardly find an equivalent standpoint in 
Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism which is strongly oriented to 
speculation.
The structural and qualitative difference between Nishida and 
Whitehead becomes clearer when we compare Whitehead with 
Nishida’s later work. Referring to the proceedings concerning 
Nishida’s view of true Reality from the standpoint of the world of 
historical reality, I would like to note the following four points as 
evidence of the structural difference between the two philosophical 
systems.
First, Nishida’s notion of the world of historical reality as the true 
Reality and Whitehead’s notion of creativity as “the universal of 
universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact”3 apparently seem 
quite similar, because they both are completely nonsubstantial and the 
most immediate direct reality which includes change and development. 
However, in Whitehead, creativity, which is crucial to an under­
standing of process, indicates ongoingness, which is “the advance 
from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the 
entities given in disjunction.”4 Here we see the priority of conjunction 
over and against disjunction in the notion of process and creativity. 
This means that process and creativity are understood to be uni-direc­
tional, future-oriented, and non-reciprocal. On the other hand, in 
Nishida, the world of historical reality is realized in the absolute pre­
sent in which past and future work together through self-contradic­
tion. It is not uni-directional but rather reciprocal. To introduce the
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terms conjunction and disjunction in Nishida* s notion of the world of 
historical reality, conjunction has no priority over and against disjunc­
tion. Nor does disjunction have priority over conjunction. Instead, be­
ing determined by absolute present, conjunction as it is is disjunction 
and disjunction as it is is conjunction.
Second, this difference derives from the fact that in Nishida the 
realization of the world of historical reality is inseparably connected 
with the realization of individual self, which is realized to be a focal 
point of the world by completely renouncing itself. In this respect 
Nishida emphasizes the eternal death of the self as the essential mo­
ment for eternal life. The unity of truth, beauty, and goodness is realiz­
ed only through the eternal death of the individual self and not before 
that. On the contrary, in Whitehead, particularly in Process and Reali­
ty, there is almost no reference to death even in the ordinary sense, to 
say nothing of eternal death. Although the perpetual perishing of ac­
tual entities is much talked about, it is not thoroughly, but only partial­
ly, realized, as the following quotations show: “Actual entities 
perpetually perish subjectively, but are immortal objectively. Actuality 
in perishing acquires objectively, while it loses subjective immediacy.”5 
This is because Whitehead’s philosophy is that of the organism, in 
which the notions of process and becoming are emphasized without the 
realization of absolute Nothingness.
IV
Third, it is remarkable in Whitehead that God is understood to have 
a dipolar nature, that is, primordial and consequent nature, and to be 
both transcendent and immanent in his relation to the world, as clearly 
shown in this quotation:
It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that 
God is immanent in the World.
It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the 
World transcends God.6
Unlike most Western philosophers, including Hegel, Whitehead clearly
5 Ibid.. p. 29.
6 Ibid., p. 348.
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emphasizes the interrelationship between transcendence and im­
manence, God and world. However, the dipolar nature of God (and ac­
tual entities) in Whitehead is essentially and qualitatively different from 
the self-identity in and through absolute contradiction of God in 
Nishida. In the dipolar nature of the Whiteheadian notion of God, 
transcendence and immanence are understood to be 50-50 in their inter­
relationship without contradiction, whereas in Nishida’s notion of 
God as the self-identity in and through absolute contradiction 
transcendence and immanence are understood to be 100% and 100%. 
Someone may say that for both transcendence and immanence to be 
100% is quite absurd and illogical, because the total would be 200%. 
Such a refutation would be made by those who are confined by ob­
jective logic, understanding everything objectively from outside. 
Nishida rejects such an objective logic and tries to establish the 
logic of basho (place); that is, the logic of the unobjectifiable absolute 
Nothingness. In his standpoint, transcendence is fully realized only by 
total negation of immanence, and immanence is fully realized only by 
total negation of transcendence. Transcendence and immanence are 
identical through self-contradiction in the total negation of total nega­
tion. Accordingly, the self-identity of 100% transcendence and 100% 
immanence is possible because it takes place in the realization of ab­
solute Nothingness. It is a completely unobjectifiable and truly subjec­
tive or existential standpoint which embraces not only radical opposi­
tion but also absolute contradiction.
What, then, does the dipolar nature of God in Whitehead mean in 
comparison with Nishida? As I said before, in Whitehead’s notion of 
the dipolar nature of God transcendence and immanence are 
understood to be 50% 50%. On that basis their interrelation and in­
teraction are fully realized. And when the totality of transcendence and 
immanence are understood not to be 200% but 100%, it sounds quite 
reasonable, without contradiction. However, in this case the totality of 
transcendence and immanence, that is, the interrelationship between 
transcendence and immanence, is objectified from somewhere without. 
In emphasizing the interaction between transcendence and immanence, 
between God and the world, where does Whitehead himself stand? 
Does he take his stand in God, in the world, or somewhere in between? 
It is impossible for Whitehead to grasp the interaction between God 
and the world simply by taking one of each as his stand. Neither is it
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possible for Whitehead to take his stand somewhere in between God 
and the world in grasping the interaction between the two unless he 
completely renounces his individual self and undergoes eternal death. 
However, we cannot find evidence of any realization of eternal death 
and the absolute negation of the individual self. This necessarily leads 
us to the conclusion that although in the Western philosophical tradi­
tion Whitehead is exceptional for his emphasis of the interrelationship 
between God and world, between transcendence and immanence, he 
nonetheless objectifies and conceptualizes the very relationship be­
tween them. (We should recall that Whitehead calls his own philosophy 
a speculative philosophy.) The result is his notion of the dipolar nature 
of God, which is structurally different from Nishida’s notion of God as 
self-identity in and through absolute contradiction. Thus, I must say 
that Whitehead’s philosophy is still based on the objective logic which 
Nishida rejects as not being the concrete logic of true Reality. This 
structural difference between them may also be clear when we consider 
that Whitehead’s notions of process and becoming do not include the 
realization of absolute Nothingness, and his notion of the interrelation 
between God and the world has no equivalent to Nishida’s important 
notion of Gyakutaio the inverse correspondence of polarity,
which is, for Nishida, crucial to the man and God relationship. In spite 
of this structural difference between Nishida and Whitehead, if one em­
phasizes the similarity and affinity between their philosophical systems, 
one merely creates misunderstanding of both philosophical systems.
Fourth, if we introduce the Hua-yen doctrine of fourfold Dhar- 
madhatu (Dharma world) to interpret Whitehead’s and Nishida’s 
philosophies, we may say that Whitehead’s philosophy represents the 
Riji Muge Hokkai that is, the world of interpenetration be­
tween the universal and the particular without hindrance, whereas 
Nishida’s philosophy represents the J//7 MugeHokkai * 4 that
is, the world of interpenetration between the particular and the 
particular without hindrance. For, due to his strong emphasis on in­
teraction and interpenetration between transcendence and immanence, 
between God and world, Whitehead’s metaphysics may be closely com­
pared with Riji Muge Hokkai, (Even in this regard I would like to 
reverse myself, because in Whitehead all actual entities are actual occa­
sions, but God alone is not an actual occasion although he is certainly 
an actual entity. This we see from the following quotation: “The term
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‘actual occasion’ will always exclude God from its scope.”7 For the 
word ‘occasion’ implies a spatio-temporal location, whereas God is 
one non-temporal actual entity.8 Accordingly, the interpenetration be­
tween God and the world is not completely realized.9 For this reason I 
characterized Whitehead as representing the Riji Muge Hokkai.)
On the other hand, Nishida’s philosophy is well represented by Jiji 
Muge Hokkai. For in the world of historical reality in Nishida’s 
philosophy, individual entities thoroughly interact with each other 
throughout the universe. Even transcendence and immanence, God 
and the self, the absolute and the relative interact with one another 
through absolute negation qua absolute affirmation. This complete in­
teraction and interpenetration between all individual entities is possible 
simply because it occurs in the ‘place*, or basho, of absolute 
Nothingness. Here again we clearly see the structural and qualitative 
difference between Nishida’s philosophy and that of Whitehead.
Accordingly, an emphasis on the similarities between Nishida and 
Whitehead may be likened to an emphasis on the similarities between 
the whale, which is a mammal and not a fish, and the shark, which is a 
fish and not a mammal, simply because both whale and shark swim in 
the same ocean.
’ Ibid., p. 88.
8 D. W. Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's Process and Reality, p. 207.
9 Since I have discussed this point in my essay “Mahayana Buddhism and 
Whitehead” included in Zen and Western Thought (University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 
I will not touch upon that issue here any further. See Zen and Western Thought, pp. 
154-168.
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